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the crisis demanded solution. Evasion and vacillation are impotent;
for, "he who fights and runs away, will live to fight another day."
The National Recovery Act and its Codes are advanced indus-
trial legislation and may be viewed as a current on which the Ship
of State rides between the Scylla of imperial industrialism and the
Charybdis of dictatorial communism. 130 There is pressing need to
distinguish the progressive and the radical, the constructive and the
destructive in the gigantic program of economic rehabilitation. The
history of American political and social crises engenders the confi-
dence that necessity will call forth another John Marshall to pilot
the Ship of State into the open sea; there are natural rights of civil
and organic nature, inherent in the American Constitution and our
common law, which transcend and must survive the enactment and
enforcement of social and industrial legislation. It is to this problem
that the judiciary of the nation is addressed; the society and industry
of the future rest in the lap of the lawyers of the United States.
EMIL F. KOCH.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AN INTERPRETATION.-When the
present administration came into power the nation was in the throes
of economic despair. Labor and industry called, from that deep
morass of disorganization and self-destruction, for some hand which
they might grasp, for some guide by which they could lift them-
selves from their desperate plight. The administration answered that
call. It set up a system that would enable business to regulate itself
and by which this ruthless and anti-social industrial warfare'would
cease; and so the N. R. A. was born.'
It was soon evident that this regulatory system was threatened
by the tendency of one group to raise itself out of the mire by sub-
jecting the other to oppression. To remove this threat a clause was
inserted by which these two opposing factions could be placed upon
a more equal footing, and by which it could be made evident that
the aspirations of both were inextricably bound up, and that one
must rise or fall with the other. This idea was embodied in a sec-
tion of the National Industrial Recovery Act, now famous as §7A,
and it is an interpretation of this feature that is here sought to be
made.2
The clause as it was written into the N. R. A. is on its face
unambiguous. It provides simply, that "Every code shall contain
the following conditions:
"LEVINE, RED SMOKE (1932); WELLS, KAPOOT (1933).
'N. Y. Times, March 4, 1934, §IV at 5 :1.
'N. Y. World-Telegram, Feb. 7, 1934, at 24:1.
CURRENT LEGISLATION
"(1) That employees shall have the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint or
coercion of employers of labor or their agents in the designa-
tion of such representatives in self-organization or in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection; (2) that no employee and
no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition
of employment to join any company union or to refrain from
joining, organizing or assisting a labor organization of his
own choosing and (3) that employers shall comply with the
maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay and other
conditions of employment approved or presented by the
President." 3
This is it and nothing more. As simple, plain and open on its
face as President Roosevelt thought at first,3a it has created such
controversy, caused such dissension in the ranks of labor and in-
dustry and been subjected to so vast an amount of interpretation and
explanation, that as a result, at this writing there is imminent in-
dustrial'warfare between labor and capital of so ominous portentions
that it threatens to wreck the administration's entire recovery pro-
gram.4 The purpose of this article will be to reconcile the various
interpretations, and to give an account of 7A's reception.
To organized labor §7A was a clarion call which aroused a
feverish activity upon the part of labor unions to save themselves
from a stagnation to which they were slowly but surely sinking,
and to cause them to rearm for the conflictY Labor hailed 7A as
its Magna Charta and thought that its fondest dreams were to be
turned into verities.0 No longer would it be criminal to preach the
doctrine of trade unionism, or to solicit members for trade unions;
no longer would the howls of the "yellow dog" plague its already
fretful slumbers. Labor was free.7 It was quick to realize the
fruits of its freedom and to rally its forces under the banner of 7A.
In a short space of time trade union membership had doubled, while
company union workers had increased threefold.8
'N. R. A. ACT of June 16, 1933, c. -, 48 Stat. [§7A, 15 U. S. C. A.
§707 (a) (1)].
'a BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 23, 1933, at 7.
'NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 1934, at 210-211.
'NATION, March 14, 1934, at 291.
' TODAY, Feb. 10, 1934, at 3.
7Ibid.
'Supra note 6.
Before June 16, 1933-423,945 employees in company unions.
Before June 16, 1933-2,800,000 in trade unions.
Approx. Feb. 10, 1934-1,164,294 employees in company unions.
Approx. Feb. 10, 1934-4,100,000 employees in trade unions.
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In contrast to the attitude of labor has been the cool reception
of 7A in the camps of industry, for the conflicting views and atti-
tude toward that section have resulted in the complete breakdowh
in the machinery of enforcement which in turn has necessitated the
new Wagner National Labor Board Bill, to interpret and strengthen
7A in the interest of labor and labor unions.9
It must be noted, that the N. R. A. provides in §7(b) that the
agreements arrived at through collective bargaining shall be enscribed
in the codes and with the approval of the President shall have the
same effect as codes of fair competition in other ways created.10
To enforce 7A the National Labor Board was called into being on
August 5, 1933, to cope with labor unrest and to assure to labor
the practical and actual benefit of what it achieved in theory.'1
Eighteen Regional Labor Boards were set up at strategic points
through the country.' 2 It was early seen that the board was pusil-
lanimous in the face of opposition.13 On February 1, 1934, Presi-
dent Roosevelt 13a issued an executive order which, at that time it
was believed,' 4 put teeth into the enforcement power of the National
Labor Board by giving the board sweeping power to order elections
for employee representation upon its own initiative, to supervise the
elections and to execute the election mandates. To enforce the elec-
tions in all its aspects the board, while itself powerless to act, could
refer the case to the national or local compliance board or call upon
the department of justice or the attorney-general to institute prose-
cution actions for violation of the provisions of 7A or the authority
of the board. Too, the board could act in furtherance of industrial
peace by providing the machinery for conciliation, mediation and
arbitration.' 5
The national Labor Board did do work of a constructive nature
along these lines, 6 but most of that was done before its inherent
(a) Figures of National Industrial Conf. Board.
(b) N. Y. Times, March 4, 1934, VIII, at 2:7.
(c) Pres. Green of A. F. L. estimates an increase of from
1,500,000 to 2,000,000 in labor union membership in the months
of June to October, 1934.
'N. Y. Times, March 11, 1934, §IX at 1:8.
" Supra note 3, §3 (a).
"Supra note (5).
'Supra note (1), §VIII at 2:8.
"In Defense of Labor, NATION, Feb. 14, 1934.
"a Amendment of executive order No. 6,580 of Feb. 1, 1934.
" U. S. NEws, Feb. 5, 1934, at 1:1.
15 Ibid.
16 The Regional Board for New York, while calling for broader powers of
subpoena and realizing the imminence of trouble, stated that as of Feb. 1, 1934,
out of 234 strikes called, the regional board had settled 181 and averted 35,
and had obtained the reinstatement of 1,793 workers and had handled cases
involving 97,913 employees.-N. Y. World-Telegram, Feb. 27, 1934, at 13:2.
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weaknesses had become obvious, and before both labor' 7 and in-
dustry18 had begun a wholesale revolt from the ranks.
The board's inaction has been condemned by laboring groups
for their dilatory tactics which served to strengthen their traditional
enemy, the company union, thereby lessening the chance of the unions
for success. Such procrastination (until the machinery of arbitra-
tion could be set in motion) gave the employer the opportunity to
carry on influential campaigns against the labor unions.'"
The "opposition," if it can be called such, to the National Labor
Board by labor groups was not because the aims and ideals which
7A and the National Labor Board were created to accomplish were
inimical to their best endeavors, for just the contrary is true, but
rather because the board's weakness stood in the way of the attain-
ment of its good intentions. The Labor unions saw "what was held
up to them as a new charter being treated as a scrap of paper." 20
On the other hand the antagonism of industrial groups was engen-
dered by real differences of opinions, by positive incompatibility of
interest, and because of what 7A promised to labor.2'
The National Labor Board's authority has been constantly chal-
lenged 22 even as to the authority of the regional boards in ordering
elections to choose representatives of the employees in collective bar-
gaining proceedings.23 Employers have intimidated employees, 24 have
threatened to discharge, and have discharged those participating in
the elections, 25 and have posted evasive notices as to the rights of
employees to organize.26 Nor have these violations been purely local,
for the American Federation of Labor charges that there is a nation-
wide conspiracy afoot to thwart the very spirit and purpose of the
collective bargaining provisions of 7A.27
What are the causes of these startling violations of authority?
There has been a criticism of the personnel of the board itself. Its
members have been accused of showing a lack of interest in its work,
The work of the National Labor Board was commended by President
Roosevelt (in a letter to Chairman Wagner), who took occasion to express
his appreciation of the board in furtherance of the administration's ideal of
industrial peace.-N. Y. Times, March 5, 1934, at 6:7.
In March the average of cases settled was 80%.
In February the average of cases settled was 69%.
Cases pending in March were 531, an increase of from 18 to 26 per cent.
Of over a million workers whose affairs have been dealt with, 750,000 have
had their disputes adjusted.
'"Supra note 13.
2' N. Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1934, at 1.
" Supra note 13.
I N. Y. Herald Tribune, March 5, 1934, at 1.
"Supra note 6; N. Y. American, March 7, 1934, at 1:8.
'Supra note 2.
IN. Y. Post, Feb. 28, 1934, at 7:1; N. Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1934, at 1.
2' N. Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 28, 1934, at 11:1; supra note 1, at 20.
I N. Y. Post, supra note 23; N. Y. World-Telegram, Feb. 28, 1934, at 11:1.
N. Y. World-Telegram, Feb. 2, 1934, at 21:8.
' N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1934, at 13:3.
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and of failing to attend to its business and to its meetings because
of other immediate duties.28 Too, the board is composed of a bi-
partisan rather than a non-partisan membership, and instead of a
conciliating and compromising attitude in the formation of its poli-
cies, the factional interests come to the fore.29 This defect has been
partly met by the executive order of the President increasing the
membership of the board by five additional members, and today there
are thirteen members, yet "six represent industry and six represent
labor." 30
Another difficulty which has lately been overcome was the de-
pendence of the National Labor Board upon the National Compli-
ance Board, which had the power to review the findings of the
former, make totally new ones, thus slowing' up the wheels of the
National Labor Board when speed was most vital, and shearing it
of power when strength was its most urgent requirement. There-
upon President Roosevelt, upon the advice of Secretary Perkins and
Administrator Johnson, severed the two boards, thus permitting the
National Labor Board to make findings of fact which are to be bind-
ing upon the Compliance Board. 31 When we take these defects into
consideration with the fact that the board has no power to subpoena,
to employ investigating officers, nor to mete out punishment, we see
that the board is helplessly shorn of strength.
The result of the increased laxity of enforcement of 7A by the
board and, therefore, the consequent restlessness on the part of
labor,3 2 has been a proportionate loss of prestige and respect for
the authority of the board, and an attempt by laborers to insure for
themselves the benefits guaranteed to them, by their only other al-
ternative when conciliation and arbitration fail, the strike.
In the past few months there has been an epidemic of strikes,33
the like of which our country has never seen before in a similar
period.3 4 Throughout the nation Craft Unions have been restless
and ready to strike.3 5  In almost every community throughout the
nation talk of strikes is prevalent.36 At this writing, in the automo-
'Supra note 13.
'Supra note 5.
' Supra note 1, at 1:3.
"N. Y. World-Telegram, March 27, 1934, at 16:1.
Administrator Johnson says that the National Compliance Board might
hold its own hearings and make its own findings of fact whether they coincide
with those of the Labor Board or not.-N. Y. Times, March 4, 1934, at 1:3.
It appears to the writer that this interpretation by Johnson is untenable in
reference to enforcement of 7A, but may be justified under §7 (b) in so far as
it relates to code enforcement, for under §7 (b) agreements atrived at through
collective bargaining are just as essential a part of the codes as any other
sections in them.
Edward A. Filene, U. S. NEWS, March 12, 1934, at 12:1.
SU. S. NEWS, March 5, 1934, at 12:1.
"Id. at 16:1.
"Id. at 12:1.
U. S. NEws, Feb. 12, 1934, at 12:1.
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bile, railroad, coal mining and shoe manufacturing trades, threatened
strikes may at any moment disrupt our industrial peace.3 7 That the
future bodes ill is predicted by Code Administrator Johnson who,
with his finger on the throbbing pulse of our economic life, predicts
that this country will shortly see the "worst epidemic of strikes in
our history." 38
What was the outlook when first 7A came into being? Its very
purpose was to insure industrial peace, and to democratize American
industry.30 Eventually, it was hoped, strikes would disappear, for,
since labor could compel collective bargaining, there would be no
need to resort to war when by peaceful measures labor could achieve
the same ends. 40 Administrator Johnson thought that not only was
the strike no longer necessary,41 but that it was henceforth unlaw-
ful, and since it was "economic sabotage" it could not be tolerated.
It seems to this writer that under the present set up of 7A and the
National Labor Board, the optimistic views of an industrial para-
dise can not be realized. If labor is promised the right to bargain
collectively and that promise is not to be an idle gesture, then the
right must be enforced. One can not effectively bargain for any-
thing unless he can give something to, or withhold something from,
the other. Labor cannot bargain unless it can strike. Its only
weapon is the strike. Take away that from it, and labor has noth-
ing with which to defend itself. A defenseless man or an im-
poverished one can obtain no advantageous bargain. He must take
what is given him and be glad of that, and so if the power of strike
is denied labor by 7A, it is shorn of its most essential right. "Noth-
ing in the words of the Act support or require such an interpreta-
tion (that the right to bargain collectively implies as a necessary in-
stance the right to strike), let alone the legality of the sympathetic
strike or the secondary boycott." 42 No less an authority than Miss
Mary Van Kleeck, director of industrial studies for Russell Sage
Foundation, and former section director of the United States De-
partment of Labor, declares that, contrary to the ideas of the Presi-
dent and his associates, the interests of labor and industry are not
the same and that what is necessarily to the advantage of one group
is not necessarily to the advantage of the other. She maintains that
"the liberty of the workers (to strike) must not be curtailed-that
workers must have the right to bargain collectively if they feel that
I NATION, Dec. 27, 1933, at 73:2; N. Y. World-Telegram, March 18,
1934, at 3:1.
' Supra note 32.
Id. at 16.
"Pierre S. DuPont, Chairman of the N. R. A. Industrial Advisory Board,
quoted in LIT. DIGEST, March 3, 1934; Frederick Winslow Taylor, quoted in
LIT. DIGEST, Dec. 16, 1933.
" Since "labor will secure under the code the maximum of what the par-
ticular economic situation permits, and no amount of militant pressure can
change the result."-Johnson.
" NATION, supra note 37.
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they are being wronged. The Government should support them in
this and act in a way to end the present distrust." 43
When 7A was adopted, it seemed, as we have previously stated,
clear and unambiguous. President Roosevelt had stated several
times that clause 7A needs no interpretation. 44 N. R. A. officials
have been hesitant about making interpretations of the law, and Gen-
eral Johnson fears that an attempt to change the statute might only
increase his troubles in guiding industry; and that the efforts to
modify or interpret 7A has been a futile battle from the first.45
Others despaired immediately, and magined that interpretations or
explanations would make of this "Magna Charta" a nullity and non-
entity.46 But we have already seen that 7A in itself could not stand.
for it is too vague, and is of little good in its present form.47 We
have seen how the prevalency of strikes and violations due to the
ambiguity of its terms and the weaknesses and ill defined nature of
the authority of the board caused its members themselves to call
helplessly for legislation to strengthen the board's enforcing arm be-
fore it becomes the hated enemy of those over whom it seeks to
exercise its jurisdiction. None could doubt the necessity for inter-
pretation after the provisions of 7A were sought to be applied, in
spite of the initial hesitancy of the administration.
The first sentence of 7A reads, "Employees shall have the
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and shall be free from interference, restraint or coercion
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives in self-organization or in their concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection." Collective bargaining is a system by which employees and
employers negotiate by groups instead of individually, to determine
working hours, wage scales, and other conditions of employment
which effect their mutual interest. The various groups of employees
choose certain individuals to treat for all, and agree to be bound by
whatever formulae the conference arrives at.48
In a joint statement by General Johnson and Donald A. Rich-
berg, on August 23, 1933, the collective bargaining provision was
interpreted in part as follows:
"Employers, likewise, can make collective bargains with
organized employees or individual agreements with those who
act individually * * * but neither employees nor employers
are required by law to agree to any particular contract whether
proposed as an individual or collective agreement." 49
"3 N. Y. Evening Post, Feb. 10, 1934, at 16:3.
" Supra note 3a.
• Ibid.
"Supra note 42.
N. Y. Evening Post, Feb. 28, 1934; editorial, col. 1.
:' U. S. NEws, Jan. 22, 1934, at 9:2.
9 Ibid. "
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"Does the act when it says employees may bargain col-
lectively mean, that all the employees of a whole industry
may bargain as a unit, or only the employees in a restricted
locality, or still more narrowly, only the employees of a given
company or a given plant or mine? The act does not say.
The Supreme Court, in Duplex v. Deering, has already held
that the words employers and employees, at least as used in
the Clayton Act, did not mean employees throughout an
industry, but only those immediately concerned. :Congress,'
said the court, 'had in mind particular individual controver-
sies, not a general class war.' Confronted by superficially
similar language, is it unlikely that the court will give these
terms a similar individualistic and restrictive interpreta-
tation ** * ?" 50
There is considerable controversy between the administrators of
7A and the unions as to who shall choose these representatives.
Shall they be chosen by a majority and be privileged to bind all, or
can the various minorities choose their own representatives to bind
themselves alone? Thus, in a factory of one thousand workers (if
the latter course be chosen), there may be five or fifty or one hun-
dred and fifty or more various collective bargaining committees,
sufficient to occupy the employers' time from morning to night,
solely in collective bargaining proceedings.
Johnson and Richberg have constantly held to the interpretation
that any minority was entitled to a conference for the purpose of
bargaining collectively and that individuals were entitled to deal
separately.51 The difficulty of upholding such an interpretation was
readily seen. 'It would strike a death blow at the practice and
theory of collective bargaining. It allows the unscrupulous employer
to divide the workers against themselves. No real advocate of
collective bargaining would argue that a worker should be free to
bargain individually after the overwhelming majority of co-workers
desire an agreement covering all." 52
The President on February 1, 1934, ordered that in the election
of representatives and in the negotiations which follow, the repre-
sentatives chosen by the majority shall represent all. 53 Whereupon
Johnson and Richberg issued a joint press release stating that it is a
violation of the law on the part of the employer to refuse to deal
with the representatives of the majority, but, too, that minorities and
even individuals may confer with employees on their own behalf.
54
On March 3, 1934, a decision was handed down by the Petro-
leum Administration Board which confirmed the view of Johnson
Supra note 42.
N. Y. Times, March 5, 1934, at 2:1; id. March 2, 1934, at 8:4.
Sen. Wagner, N. Y. Evening Post, March 1, 1934, at 2:7.
N. Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1934, at 8:4.
N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1934, at 25:1.
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and Richberg, and saves the theoretical rights of minorities, but
gives a more practical interpretation of the controversy. When
spokesmen for the majority arranged a collective bargain it was to
bind all, unless the minorities complained. They certainly would
not complain that they were getting too much, and, of course, if they
felt themselves slighted or unfavorably treated, they would be given
fair treatment, but "it is regarded as hardly likely that a decision
would be fair if it allowed the minority to chisel under the standards
set by the majority."55
Who are the "chosen representatives of the employees"? In
case of a highly unionized industry, the union was designated as the
representative of the employees. But in cases where there are com-
pany unions and trade unions side by side, one may refuse to deal
with the other. The railroad industry, which has a collective bar-
gaining provision similar to 7A, has decided that whenever a con-
troversy shall arise and the need for collective bargaining becomes
apparent, the administrative authority, similar to our National Labor
Board, holds an election to ascertain who the representatives are to
be, and those chosen at that election act for all and bind all groups.56
Another important question which arose out of the difficulty of
interpreting 7A has been settled partially by the courts. That ques-
tion was whether an employee who goes out on strike, thereby leav-
ing his job and being taken off the payroll, may vote in the choice of
representatives for a collective bargain. "Where the majority of the
employees are members of a particular union, or desire to organize
within a particular union," it has been held they are, although strik-
ing, still employees for the purpose of this Act.5 7
There is before Congress at this moment a plan whereby 7A
might be transformed from a meaningless scrap of paper to the real
Magna Charta which labor had first hoped it might be. That bill
was sponsored by Senator Robert F. Wagner, of New York. to
tighten the collective bargaining provisions of the law and to make
permanent the National Labor Board on a statutory base.5" Fully
aware of the impotency, the inadequacy and the temporary set-up
of the present National Labor Board, and mindful of the fact that
the continued challenge by industry and labor of the authority of
the old National Labor Board would result in the entire collapse of
the Administration Recovery program, 59 and in the imperiling of
the general welfare, 60 the bill was created to establish an equality of
bargaining power between employer and employee and provide the
'Supra note 51, at 3:1.
NEw REPUBLIc, Aug. 9, 1933, at 329:1.
' Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., N. J. Ch., 168 AtI. 562 (1933).
' N. Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 6, 1934, at 1.
wSupra note 4.
' Supra note 2, at 24:1.
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Labor Board with power to deal with problems over which it is
forced to exercise jurisdiction.60a
True collective bargaining is being nullified by the efforts of
company unions; organizations whose membership is limited to
employees of a single company under the "guiding" spirit, financial
support and dominance of the employer himself.61 What a sham this
could be if unscrupulously administered is self-evident, for it de-
prives workers of the wider co-operation essential to cope with the
methods of exploiters and denies them the opportunity to truly
present their own views. How quickly the company unions sprang
into being we have already seen. How like unto Jason and the
dragon's heads it was, for as quickly as Jason cut off the dragon's
heads, just as quickly did two new heads spring forth; and as speed-
ily and as strenuously as labor battled to achieve its victories, just
twice as quickly did company unions, like dragon heads, rise to
plague it. 6 2 In all fairness to the company unions it must be said
that they exercise some very valuable functions: that of promoting
group welfare activities and of improving personal relations.
It is argued that company unions have their place in avoiding dis-
turbances, 3 but tranquility may exist side by side with injustice
and exploitition. and where industrial slavery is bought at the price
of peace, peace is too costly. Nor have the advocates of company
unions demonstrated that their proposition of peace is true, for our
present state of industrial unrest exists because of the failure of
employers to observe the spirit of 7A, in advancing the company
union as the employees' sole representative in collective bargaining.
Through trade associations and chambers of commerce, em-
ployers have been able to pool their information and resources and
act concertedly in the attainment of favorable legislation and in
shaping public opinion. Unless labor is organized under their own
leaders, and permitted to unite for the same purposes, no equality
exists. When an employee of a particular company has to haggle
and argue for his group and against his employer, since their inter-
ests necessarily conflict, 64 the danger to the continuance of the source
of his livelihood is apparent. Besides the threat of company union-
ism to industry which he seeks to avert, Senator Wagner wants to
'a N. Y. Evening Post, March 2, 1934, at 2:6.
"Sen. Wagner, N. Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1934, §IV at 5:8.
' The number of employees covered by Company Unions rose from 432,000
in 1932 to 1,164,000 in 1933, representing a gain of 169%. More than 69% of
the Company Union schemes now in existence have been inaugurated in the
brief period since the passage of the recovery act.-Sen. Wagner, N. Y. Times,
March 11, 1934, §IX at 1:2&3.
In furtherance of a "conspiracy by many employers to defeat the very
cause and spirit of the N. R. A. so far as it concerns the right of workers to
join unions of their own choosing * * *."--Pres. Green of A. F. L., N. Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 1934, at 1.
' Edward T. Weir, N. Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1934, at 22:1.
Mary Van Kleek, N. Y. Evening Post, Feb. 10, 1934, at §I1:1.
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settle the majority-minority conflict in relation to the choice of repre-
sentatives for collective bargaining, and to reaffirm the duty resting
upon the employer to receive and recognize the duly elected repre-
sentatives. A consideration of the bill itself would not be amiss here.
After setting forth the importance of equality in bargaining
strength to the free flow of commerce,65 a section is devoted ;to
reaffirming the privileges secured to labor under 7A,66 and to
defining unfair trade practices as acts impairing those privileges.6 7
Employers may not refuse to deal with employees' representatives,68
engage in union activities,69 nor contribute to the support of any
labor organization (company union)*70 The closed shop may be
maintained for periods of not more than one year, if such an agree-
ment has been arrived at by the employer and the labor union repre-
senting at least a majority of the employees.71 These provisions may
be enforced by injunction proceedings in equity in the district courts
but solely at the request of the Regional National Labor Boards.72
Title 2 provides for a permanent Labor Board of seven members
appointed by the President, two representing the employers; two, the
employees; and three acting on behalf of the public. The bill recog-
nized the weaknesses of the old National Labor Board as to the
conflicting interest and duties of its members and their consequent
inability to devote their whole time to their work, by prohibiting the
three representatives of the general public from engaging in any
other business, 73 and fixing definite tenures of office and salaries
for them.74
The board is empowered to act as mediator in labor disputes,7 5
hold public hearings, 76 make findings of fact and issue appropriate
orders.77 It may call upon the district courts to enforce such de-
crees,78 but the board's proceedings may not be stayed by the injunc-
tions of any court.79 In arbitration proceedings the board may act
upon the request of any interested group, and the agreements so
reached are binding upon the submitting party.8 0 The Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia may make an order confirming the
awards so made, upon the petition of any party to the arbitration















proceedings 81 or may vacate the order if the National Labor Board
exceeded its powers, or so imperfectly executed its task as not to
reach a mutual and definite award.8 2
Who are the representatives of the employees is a question
solely within the jurisdiction of the board when such a controversy
might "obstruct the free flow of commerce," 83 but, otherwise, it may
merely offer its services in making the determination.8 4 The de-
mands of the regional labor boards for authority to subpoena wit-
nesses and require the production of relevant books and papers has
been met by §208 which grants such powers, and provides further
that no witness may refuse to testify upon the plea of "self-incrimi-
nation," but evidence so compiled may not be used to prosecute him
after he has claimed his privilege. 85 The boards are empowered to
make new rules and rescind old ones, in order to carry out their
purposes.8 0 The bill seeks to resolve the controversy as to the rights
of labor to strike and expressly affirms that "nothing in this act shall
be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike." 87 It was also resolved that the bill shall
supersede any conflicting provisions of 7A and of the codes adopted
pursuant to the N. R. A.
8 8
While most commentators have long recognized that such legis-
lation was absolutely imperative, nevertheless widespread and pow-
erful opposition has already developed on the part of industry 8 9
who see in it possibility for a monopolistic power on the part of
labor to strip the employer of the power to bargain effectively or to
treat directly with his own employees, and they fear that the bill, if
adopted, would foment industrial strife rather than tend to the
peaceful settlement of disputes. It is objected that the powers of
the board are more drastic than any other agency of the United
States Government in peace or in war, and superior even to the
courts in respect of compelling the attendance of persons, the produc-
tion of records and the ability to change its rules as it proceeds. 90
Another criticism of the Wagner National Labor Board Bill is
that the government's espousal of the cause of labor is incompatible









" James A. Emery, General Council for the Nat. Assn. of Mfrs. "These
groups combined are the largest employers of labor in the country. Their total
payrolls exceed in numbers the entire membership of the A. F. L. or any other
large Union organization. In their number may be included the automotive,
steel and public utility industries of the country."-Brooklyn Daily Eagle,
March 2, 1934, at -:3.
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practices by labor unions, while the acts of employers are carefully
circumscribed. This is in conformity with the general policy of the
Administration to encourage unionization and to limit the effects of
company unions in order to effectuate the purpose of 7A, and to
provide equality of bargaining power and the democratization of
industry.91
A movement is already afoot to bring labor unions under the
regulation of the government by obliging them to incorporate and
file periodic reports on their operations, for if labor is being coerced
by employers, it is likewise subjected to interference and restraint by
union officials who sometimes resort to violence and intimidation and
oftentimes spend large sums of money illegitimately to prey upon
the employees and employers alike. Certainly, if unfair trade prac-
tices are forbidden to industry they must also be prohibited to
labor. 9
2
Although it is this writer's opinion that the bill in substantially
its present form ought to be adopted, since it is the only remedy for
7A's ills that would placate union labor, nevertheless, its passage
becomes daily more unlikely. All await the reports as to the success
of the Detroit negotiations of the American Labor Disputes Boards
before so drastic a change as Senator Wagner desires is adopted.
The President himself has made no comment on the bill either one
way or the other, and it is to him that the legislators look for a
definite labor policy. If the formula arrived at in the settlement of
the automobile strike is successful (whereby company unions were
given the same status as labor unions, and minority groups as well
as majorities were represented in shop councils), then little hope can
be expected for the passage of the Wagner bill, for its objective is
the abolition of company unions and minority representation in col-
lective bargaining proceedings. 93
As to the N. R. A. itself, of which 7A is an integral part,
President Roo~evelt, in his annual message to Congress, said that
"though the machinery, hurriedly devised, may need readjustment
from time to time, nevertheless I think you will agree with me that
we have created a permanent feature of our modernized, industrial
structure and that it will continue under the supervision but not the
arbitrary dictation, of the government itself." 94
Should the N. R. A. be deemed unconstitutional (though the
trend of the decisions of the courts is towards its constitutionality),
it is doubted whether labor will easily relinquish what 7A has so
gloriously held out to it or will surrender without a struggle the
opportunity to "exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just
reward for his service and to preserve a decent standard of living." 95
CARL E. ALPER.
(1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 1130.
' William D. Rawllins, in N. Y. World-Telegram, March 2, 1934, at 35:2.
' N. Y. Evening Post, April 9, 1934, at 12:3.
"January 3, 1934.
'Suprra note 65.
